This article first appeared in the St. Louis Beacon: During his 2009 Cairo speech, President Barack Obama acknowledged that in 1953 “the United States played a role in the overthrow of a democratically elected Iranian government.” The complex history that coup exemplifies must be understood as we interpret the moderate persona of Hassan Rouhani, Iran’s new president. In particular, as negotiations begin this week, Mr. Obama should recall his 2009 speech and remain sensitive to the sometimes-sordid role we have played in Iran’s history.
In 1905, Britain was searching for Persian (subsequently renamed Iran) petroleum and initiating decades of colonial exploitation. Simultaneously, a democratic revolution was challenging the authority of Persia’s shah (Farsi for king). The resulting 1906 constitution has no democratic equivalent in Middle Eastern history.
The constitution guaranteed press freedom and equality before the law, contained safeguards against arbitrary arrest, and empowered a legislature that included a popularly elected National Assembly.
The shah became a constitutional monarch. His budget required Assembly approval; his ministers were responsible to Parliament and could be removed by Parliament; and his powers were derived from the people, not from God.
Fast forward now to 1951 when Mohammad Mossadegh was elected prime minister. The charismatic Mossadegh was a committed democrat in an authoritarian region. He became a global phenomenon who met with President Truman, was Time magazine man of the year, and was idolized throughout the Middle East.
But Mossadegh believed that Iran’s economy depended upon Iranian control of its oil. He argued before the U.N. that British oil profits in 1950 alone exceeded what it had paid Iran during the previous half century.
So in 1951, he introduced legislation whose passage nationalized Iranian oil. Britain was furious. It pursued a global boycott of Iranian crude and considered military action to seize Iran’s massive Abadan refinery. And, jointly with the U.S., it engineered the 1953 coup that overthrew Mossadegh and ushered in the murderous quarter century rule of Muhammad-Reza Shah Pahlavi. The brutality of the shah’s American armed regime foreshadowed the 1979 Islamic revolution.
This combination of a democratic history and western exploitation helps explain how “Death to America” exultations and a sharia-based theocracy can coexist with a semi-freely elected president and what may be the most Western oriented people in the Middle East. It is the incongruous backdrop of the negotiations.
As he pursues those discussions, Mr. Obama’s overarching challenge is discerning whether smiling Iranian faces reflect genuine outreach or a tactical pursuit of eased sanctions. In doing so, he should be attuned to Iranian sensitivities. The 1953 coup may be our most consequential post war foreign policy blunder With Mossadegh, everything seemed possible in Iran and the Middle East. His ouster brought the shah’s tyranny and, ultimately, Iran’s mullahs, decades of animosity, support for terrorists and today’s nuclear standoff.
Iranians have vivid memories of 1953 and of our sponsorship of the shah. Other grievances include the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists (presumably by Israel), Western silence when Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran, and the U.S. ignoring a conciliatory 2003 Iranian letter that sought dialogue.
These circumstances help explain why Iran’s pride will not succumb pliantly to U.S. demands, no matter how onerous the sanctions. Moreover, Iran has repeatedly and correctly affirmed its sovereign right to process nuclear material and conceding this issue will be politically impossible. Alternative win-win approaches are essential.
The president should seek a comprehensive inspection regime, the export of spent Iranian nuclear fuel to prevent reprocessing and a reduced number of Iranian centrifuges to preclude any rush to a bomb. He should acknowledge that 20 percent enriched uranium is necessary to produce medical radioisotopes and seek eased sanctions that permit Iran to import prescribed quantities of such isotopes as an alternative to domestic production. He should offer technical assistance to facilitate Iranian nuclear power plants.
But most urgently, Mr. Obama must recognize that the time window is narrow. This is partly because negotiation avenues may close as Iran approaches the breakout phase of enrichment. Moreover, Rouhani faces intense pressure from Iranian hardliners and his options are constrained by a supreme leader who distrusts the United States and is sensitive to those same pressures. Without progress, Rouhani’s flexibility will erode as it did when he was fired as nuclear negotiator in 2003 when a temporary enrichment freeze led nowhere.
So Mr. Obama must be decisive. He should take the high road and leave the military threat business to Israel. He should quickly propose a meaningful easing of sanctions, probably related to Iranian access to global banking, so Rouhani can demonstrate that moderation has benefits. The quid quo pro should include an enrichment moratorium. Both sides will understand that, without progress, all concessions will be reversed.
Time will determine whether nuclear negotiations can succeed, if they presage broader discussions of other issues. But to have a chance, there must be mutual confidence building measures. Without such steps, today’s partly open window will close.
Ken Schechtman is a freelance writer and a professor at the Washington University School of Medicine.